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Abstract—Group management is a fundamental building
block of today’s Internet applications. Mailing lists, chat
systems, collaborative document edition but also online social
networks such as Facebook and Twitter use group management
systems. In many cases, group security is required in the sense
that access to data is restricted to group members only. Some
applications also require privacy by keeping group members
anonymous and unlinkable. Group management systems rou-
tinely rely on a central authority that manages and controls
the infrastructure and data of the system. Personal user data
related to groups then becomes de facto accessible to the central
authority.
In this paper, we propose a completely distributed approach
for group management based on distributed hash tables. As
there is no enrollment to a central authority, the created
groups can be leveraged by various applications. Following
this paradigm we describe a protocol for such a system. We
consider security and privacy issues inherently introduced
by removing the central authority and provide a formal
validation of security properties of the system using AVISPA.
We demonstrate the feasibility of this protocol by implementing
a prototype running on top of Vuze’s DHT.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years witnessed a rapid growth of Online Social
Networks (OSN) sites. OSNs allow communication with
social acquaintances or with users having similar interests.
The notion of group, also referred to as social order [4] is
a fairly natural way to sort interactions in our daily social
life [17]. Many of today’s Internet applications can be
considered as group management systems: OSN but also
mailing lists, chat systems or collaborative document edition
systems.
From a security and privacy perspective, it is desirable that
group information, such as the exchanged messages but also
the group member list, is not accessible to anyone outside
the group. However, group management systems often rely
on a central authority that manages and controls the system’s
infrastructure and data. Thus, personal user information
used during group communication, such as acquaintances,
political views and photos, become accessible to the central
authority. We believe that an interesting research direction
is to give users back control of this data.
Other drawbacks of group management systems with
centralized authority may be mentioned: (i) The scalability
of the system depends on the capacity of the central authority
to dimension the infrastructure resources according to the
load. (ii) Sharing or reusing groups from one application
to another is difficult, as many group management systems
define their own proprietary solution and infrastructure. Yet,
a group of users subscribed to a VoD service should be able
to anonymously contribute to movie reviews on a partner
movie site. (iii) Bootstrapping new group communication
applications requires deployment of a new dedicated infras-
tructure and system. Therefore, there is a need for a generic
and reusable group management mechanism that could be
leveraged by various applications dealing with groups.
While contributions have been made for some of the
previous problems regarding privacy concerns [5, 3] or
regarding scalability issues [20], none of these approaches
is able to resolve all above concerns. In addition, a central
authority has low interest in deploying privacy preserving
solutions such as [5, 3]. Therefore, and similarly to Diaspora
[13], a development project for a distributed OSN (see
Section VI), we believe that only a distributed system with
no central authority is able to resolve all of the above issues.
In such a system the infrastructure is typically composed of a
set of end-user devices, which we call nodes, running a piece
of software and providing spare storage and CPU resources
to the system.
With a distributed system as described before, we must
assume that some participating nodes have been compro-
mised and are under the control of an adversary. No central
authority can guarantee that the devices running system
nodes are honest. In such a context, we are thus interested
in building a distributed group management system with
fair security and privacy properties against participating
nodes. Whisper [23] has similar objectives and specifi-
cally focuses on confidential communication within formed
groups. Whisper achieves them by combining gossip-based
communication protocols and onion routing. In this paper,
we focus on a broader set of services that allow building
a complete group management system. On the security
side, Whisper considers a threat model where nodes fully
comply with the specified protocol but try to passively
eavesdrop member and group information or any other type
of message not meant to be read by this particular node.
Whilst we consider the same threat model regarding privacy
properties, we extend the model to a Dolev-Yao adversary
[14] regarding security properties and formally validate our
security objectives against the latter attacker.
Contributions: we propose a completely distributed ap-
proach for group management requiring no central authority,
based on Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs). The proposed
system is generic and may be leveraged by various applica-
tions that need group management.
The system offers a set of security properties against
adversaries that compromised nodes of the system. This
includes confidentiality and integrity of group information
against a Dolev-Yao adversary [14]. In addition the system
enables user anonymity and ensures that users belonging to
two different groups stay unlinkable, in particular against
nodes of the DHT that comply with the protocol specifica-
tion but try to passively steal information of other partic-
ipants or groups. If required by group policy, anonymous
communication between group members is also possible.
We provide a formal validation of security properties
of the protocol using AVISPA [1] and discuss to what
extent the proposed system meets the privacy objectives.
The proposed system does not try to address attacks on the
system availability, such as Byzantine failures. Instead, we
refer to the recent advances in this field [26]. We however
address the specific security and privacy problems that have
been introduced by removing the central authority and by
moving to a completely distributed architecture.
Finally, we prototyped our protocol on top of the
Vuze DHT. While limitations remain because of the non-
optimized Vuze DHT, we show that distributed and private
group management is feasible with acceptable performances.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the proposed group management system
with no security. We then present in Section III our security
objectives and considered adversaries, the cryptographic
means and security protocol used. In Section IV we analyze
the security and privacy properties of the system. We then
present in Section V a prototype of our system, and the
results of a 2.5 day execution. Related work is presented in
Section VI. Finally we conclude with Section VII.
II. A DISTRIBUTED GROUP MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
A. Motivating example
We propose collaborative document edition as an exam-
ple that motivates the needs of a social-based and secure
application. Collaborative document edition is an example
where users want visible actions to be restricted to a trusted
group of people; however, the decentralized location of the
edited document is also of interest for privacy, as opposed
to storage at a single service provider.
Our group management system allows the creation of a
group dedicated to specific documents. Then it allows the
control of who should be able to join the group of people
editing the document. The group(s) administrator(s) grants
access to a user. Depending on the document policy editions
could be performed anonymously. It is also possible to hide
which pseudonym made the modifications. Modifications are
Figure 1. High level view of our group management system: multiple
applications are accessing groups managed by users. Groups are mapped
to random DHT locations, and are hosted on commodity hardware.
saved and accessible on nodes participating to the group
management system, in a distributed fashion, thus potentially
allowing a large number of users to edit the same document.
Users that are banned from the group of editors, users that
decided to leave, or any other non group member, are not
able to perform editions, nor to read the document.
B. System schematic
A distributed hash table is a well known tool when it
comes to decentralized and scalable 1 to 1 communication. It
exports a basic interface providing PUT and GET operations,
allowing to map < key, value > pairs to nodes participating
in the system. This is done by hashing an object’s content,
in order to obtain a random address on the DHT’s address
space (typically of size 160 bits, as e.g. in the Vuze’s DHT).
Nodes are themselves responsible for a subset of this space,
based on their position in the DHT (depending on their ID
in the same address space).
In this paper, we assume a Byzantine Fault Tolerant DHT
for building our system. Indeed, recent advances make DHTs
tolerant to Byzantine adversaries, while conserving loga-
rithmic cost of operation in expectation [26]. Basic storage
systems on top of DHTs [22] can also implement Byzantine
fault tolerant replication in relatively stable environments,
using mechanisms providing eventual consistency [24]. Nev-
ertheless, handling both dynamicity and BFT nodes is still
under research [7].
We design our group management system around a group
structure. This abstraction, composed of a root, a member
list, a wall and an inbox, allows the representation of com-
plex objects and interactions. A user that joins the system
can create principals. We consider a principal as an instance
of a group structure, the list being for instance in the context
of OSNs filled with friends, and the wall by messages for this
given principal; the inbox receiving system or user messages.
Users can also create and manage groups, which contain
other users, groups and objects. Belonging to a group, thus
being a member, means being able to access objects of that
group and interact with other group members, depending on
the defined groups privacy and security policy. Users create
principals to join with groups, possibly one new principal
for each joined group. Group creators can create and destroy
groups and define the join policy and the visibility policy
of the group, as illustrated in Table I. Administrators handle
join and leave requests. The great flexibility regarding the
join policy and the visibility enables very different types of
applications to run on top of the system. The roles creator,
administrator and member depend on the knowledge of
cryptographic keys described in Section III-B.
On an implementation level, the root is the entry point
of a group structure; it is a file containing metadata about
group’s attributes, and pointers to list and wall. The list
references principals and groups that are members of the
current group. The inbox is a list of messages, typically
join request from principals. Finally, the wall is to be seen
as a space containing raw data as objects (if their size is
small) or references to objects, and system messages. On the
distributed side, each element of a group structure, as well
as nodes’ inbox, is hosted on a random DHT node (and then
replicated on node’s neighbors for reliability [22]). Figure 1
presents a high level view of the system, with applications
leveraging groups of users.
This system is made available to programmers through
an API, providing basic operations to create, manage, join,
leave, list members of a group, or to send a message to a
given principal or to the whole group for instance.
C. Benefits and properties
As opposed to the design of an access management for a
particular application, the purpose of abstracting the notion
of group as a general system-core entity is to provide means
of genericity, reusability and applicability. Our group man-
agement system is generic in the sense that the operations it
provides are general yet powerful enough to be leveraged by
multiple social-based applications. When a group is formed
in our system, it can be accessed by different applications,
providing reusability. In other words, a group instance can
be used by multiple applications at runtime, without the need
for those applications to collaborate or to be aware of their
respective existence. Finally, applicability comes from the
fact that our system can be run on commodity hardware,
avoiding the need for investment in a server farm or rental
of a specific cloud service. As it is by nature distributed, it
can be hosted on user machines, along with the application
that is using it. Finally, relying on a DHT and distributing
responsibilities to random nodes allows our system to be
scalable in the number of users and in the number of groups.
Scalability in the number of users per group can however be
an issue for very large groups, as nodes hosting structures
may be contacted frequently. However, studies [17] reveal
that group sizes are following a power-law distribution, with
a vast majority of groups containing only few members.
For very large groups, we do not claim to provide better
scalability than traditional distributed applications as for
instance publish/subscribe systems, also relying on master
nodes in DHTs [11].
III. SECURITY PROTOCOL
A. Security and privacy objectives
In this work we focus on the attacks that become possible
because of the distributed nature of our group management
system: some nodes providing storage and CPU resources
could be under the control of an adversary. Attacks leading
to user profiling and De-anonymization [6, 25] have been
demonstrated against deployed OSNs. These attacks rely on
publicly available group member lists. Our system does not
claim additional resistance to such attacks for groups with
publicly available member lists.
Our security objectives are relative to the Dolev-Yao (DY)
adversary [14]. The DY adversary fully controls the network
and some nodes but can not reverse any cryptographic
operation. Our security objectives are:
• Ensure the confidentiality of private and secret keys,
see table II.
• Ensure the access to public keys according to group
policy.
• Ensure access control to group information (wall, list,
membership) according to group policy.
• Ensure the integrity of messages sent by participants.
• Ensure the security of the capture and update mecha-
nism (see III-B).
Regarding availability, the present work does not address
Byzantine failures. We refer to the recent advances in this
field [26]. We however discuss the risk of an adversary
flooding the DHT or squatting addresses1.
The privacy objectives listed below are relative to an
adversary that adheres to the protocol but uses information
from controlled nodes and observed messages to gain addi-
tional information. Following the terminology of Pfitzman
et al. [19], the privacy objectives are:
• Members anonymity: the adversary can not retrieve the
identity of a group member.
• Senders anonymity: the adversary can not retrieve the
sender of a private message.
• Unlinkability with IP address: the adversary can not
associate group members with IP addresses, and thus
use the IP address as an identifier.
• Members unlinkability: the adversary shall not link two
identities in the system. In particular he shall not infer
that a principal is member of two different groups.
1Note that the DY adversary is not used here as he succeeds in blocking
any protocol.
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❤
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Join Policy
List Visibility Anyone Members Administrator
Anyone may join
open Facebook group chat room survey, newsletter
petition secret Facebook group RSS feed
Selected join
program committee picture sharing subscription to VoD
outlook invite transport system
Table I
LEVELS OF GROUP JOIN POLICY AND LIST VISIBILITY, AND EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION.
Our system does not provide unobservability. An adversary
may infer group information like estimating cardinality or
the frequency of actions. However we discuss how a suffi-
ciently large DHT together with the PUT/GET mechanism
could complicate the observability. Note that there exist
obvious limitations to the above privacy objectives: trivial
anonymity sets, principals explicitly revealing identities, etc.
We do not address those issues in the present work.
B. Cryptographic means
A set of mechanisms allows achieving the security and
privacy objectives described in the previous section. First,
the usage of cryptographically generated address (CGA)
[18, 2] on the DHT ensures that only the owner of a
given public private key pair is able to control the cal-
culated address. Second, each node of the DHT verifies
the signatures of data stored at an address that the node
currently hosts. The nodes deny updates if the data is not
signed with the private key used by the CGA mechanism.
We call this mechanism the secure address capture and
a secure update mechanism. Finally, users of the group
communication system do not need to run individual nodes.
Instead, the users use PUT and GET operations to write
and retrieve data at specific addresses in the DHT. Thus,
users never communicate directly with each other, which
allows keeping them anonymous. This concept is similar to
the usage of post-office boxes in the postal system.
All data structures have a set of cryptographic keys.
Public-private key pairs ensure the structure’s integrity
and are used to distribute write permissions to the users.
Symmetric keys ensure the structure’s confidentiality and
are used to distribute read permissions to the users. The
cryptographically generated address (CGA) is calculated
using a hash function, noted h() hereafter, on the structure’s
public key. Cryptographically generated addresses ensure
that only the owner of a given public private key pair is
able to control the calculated address.
All structures of type root, list and wall are self-
signed using the structure’s public and private key pair
K,K−1. In order to allow verification of the signatures by
the storing nodes themselves and by anyone retrieving the
structure, the public key K is also stored in clear-text at the
structure’s storage address h(K). Each self-signed structure
has a counter c that is incremented at each update to prevent
replay attacks.
The address capture is successful when the storing node
verifies that the address is empty and c = 0. The update is
successful when the storing node verifies that the address is
not empty and the signing key is unchanged and the counter
is correctly incremented2.
The inbox structure is not self signed as a whole and not
subject to the capture and update mechanism. This allows
anyone writing into the inbox. However each message is
self-signed using the sender’s keys. In order to preserve
the senders anonymity against the storing node, the sender’s
public key is encrypted within the sent message using the
receiver’s public key (see Section III-C).
Table II gives an overview of the different keys and
addresses used by the system. The root structure is not
encrypted. Thus, any user knowing the public key Kr or the
address h(Kr) is able to retrieve the root structure. However,
the root structure’s integrity and write protection is ensured
by the public private key pair Kr,K−1r . Kr is stored in clear-
text at the address h(Kr), which allows nodes and users to
verify the integrity and correct location of the structure. The
member list is encrypted with a key Sl and signed by the
key K−1l . Any user having the key K
−1
l and Sl can update
the list. Any user having the key Sl can read the member
list. Similarly to the root structure, Kl is stored in clear-text
at the address h(Kl). The wall is encrypted with key Sw
and signed by the key K−1w . Anyone knowing Sw can read
the data on the wall. Anyone having K−1w and Sw can write
on the wall. Kw is stored in clear-text at the address h(Kw).
Finally, the inbox is not protected in integrity. However each
stored message in the inbox is encrypted with the public key
Ki of the inbox. In addition, the sender of a message also
signs the message with its private key.
Table III summarizes keys required for each the roles
introduced in Section II. Members receive keys for a given
group according to the group policy.
C. Protocols
We describe the main protocols of our system using the
common Alice & Bob notation. In this notation the statement
”x sends the message m to y” is denoted x → y : m.
To denote a message m encrypted by a key K we note
2The increment is modulo the width of the counter, a long integer in our
implementation.
Structure Storage address Clear-text Signing key Encryption key Counter
Root h(Kr) Kr K−1r None cr
List h(Kl) Kl K−1l Sl cl
Wall h(Kw) Kw K−1w Sw cw
Inbox h(Ki) None Sender’s private key Ki none
Table II
GROUP STRUCTURES CRYPTOGRAPHIC MEANS.
{m}K . To denote a message m signed by a key K−1,
we use the compact form {m}K−1 instead of the longer
m.{h(m)}K−1 . This hides the construction for existential
unforgeability. This also stresses that the signature does not
protect confidentiality. We note x → dht(a) : m when
x performs the operation PUT (a,m) over the DHT. We
note dht(a) → x : m when x performs the operation
m = GET (a) from the DHT. We denote a list as [, ]. Finally
we use a.b for the concatenation of a and b.
Using this notation the general form of the capture mech-
anism is:
x → dht(h(K)) : {type.c.K.payload}K−1.
The strings root, list, once, wall, helo, name and
join denote message types.
1) Creating a group: Creating a group mainly consists
of capturing the DHT addresses for components (root,
list, wall) and publishing the group name in a direc-
tory. First the group creator generates a set of keys:
(K−1r ,Kr), (K
−1
i ,Ki), (K
−1
l ,Kl), (K
−1
w ,Kw), Sl, Sw and
plays the group creation protocol as follows:
g → dht(h(Kr)) : {{root.cr.Kr.Ki}K−1
i
}K−1r (1)
g → dht(h(Kl)) : {list.cl.{[]}Sl .Kl}K−1
l
(2)
g → dht(h(Kw)) : {wall.cw.{[]}Sw .Kw}K−1w (3)
g → dht(h(Ki.0)) : {once.{cl}K−1
l
}Kl (4)
g → directory : {name.Kr}K−1r (5)
Messages (1) (2) (3) set-up the data structure for the group
Message (4) stores a signed and encrypted version of the list
counter cl at the address h(Ki.0). This counter is used as an
anti-replay protection for join requests as shown in the join
protocol below. We choose the address h(Ki.0) because it
depends from Ki and because it does not override the inbox
h(Ki). Message (5) publishes the group name in a directory.
2) Creating a principal: As indicated in Section II, a
principal is a group possibly with no wall and no member
list. A principal willing to remain anonymous will not
publish the public key of her inbox and not publish any
information into a directory. First the user generates a set of
keys: K−1p ,Kp.
p → dht(h(Kp)) : {root.Kp}K−1p
3) Joining a group: This is the most important operation
in our group management system. First the principal gen-
erates key pair K−1j ,Kj . h(Kj) is an inbox for receiving
messages from the administrator. In our example, h(Kj) is
also used for receiving messages from other group members.
Note that other applications may use two different inboxes
here.
Then the operation has three main stages.
• The principal puts a join request.
directory → p : {name.Kr}K−1r (1)
dht(h(Kr)) → p : {{root.cr.Kr.Ki}K−1
i
}K−1r (2)
dht(h(Ki.0)) → p : {once.{cl}K−1
l
}Kl (3)
p → dht(h(Ki)) : {{{join.Kp.Kj.{once.
{cl}K−1
l
}Kl}K−1p }K−1j
}Ki (4)
• An administrator a gets and processes the join request.
dht(h(Ki)) → a : {{{join.Kp.Kj.{once.
{cl}K−1
l
}Kl}K−1p }K−1j
}Ki (5)
dht(h(Kl)) → a : {list.cl.{[X ]}Sl .Kl}K−1
l
(6)
a → dht(h(Ki.0)) : {once.{cl + 1}K−1
l
}Kl (7)
a → dht(h(Kl)) : {list.cl + 1.{[X, (Kp,Kj)]}Sl .
Kl}K−1
l
.Kl (8)
a → dht(h(Kj)) : {{helo.[keys]}K−1
i
}Kj (9)
• The principal retrieves the group information.
dht(h(Kj)) → p : {{helo.[keys]}K−1
i
}Kj (10)
The counter cl is used in messages (3) and (7) to prevent
replay attacks. It is signed and encrypted by administrators
and used as a ticket in a join request. Upon processing the
join request an administrator checks that the counter value
corresponds to the counter value of the list (in fact, strict
equality is not required, it is sufficient that the counter is
greater or equal than the current list counter).
In message (6), [X ] is the current list of members. The
administrator sends message (8) for adding Kp in the list
and update the counter accordingly.
In message (9) and (10) the value of [keys] depends on
the group policy. The minimum is [] for a totally private
Role Required keys
Creator K−1r
Administrator Ki, K−1i , K
−1
l
, K
−1
w , Sl, Sw
Member Sl, Sw , K−1w depending on group policy
Table III
GROUP ROLES AND ASSOCIATED KEYS.
group, typically for subscriptions to catalogs (see Table I).
The maximum is the full list of keys for a totally open group.
For the example of Section II-A the key list is [Sw,K−1w ].
This lets anyone read/write the wall and keeps the user list
private.
4) Taking actions in the group: After joining a group, a
principal may enjoy group activities. In our example a princi-
pal will anonymously contribute to the shared document. We
show the protocol exchange to do so in a minimalist model
of a shared document (that just allows read and replace).
dht(h(Kw)) → p : {wall.cw.{[old]}Sw .Kw}K−1w
p → dht(h(Kw)) : {wall.cw + 1.{[new]}Sw .Kw}K−1w
5) Public communications: Anyone knowing h(Ki) may
write a message in the corresponding inbox.
p → dht(h(Ki)) : mess.message
Such communication can not be avoided in environments
with no central authority. Optimistically this is an opportu-
nity to contact principals that publish their address h(Ki).
Pessimistically this is spam. Note that in our motivating
example h(Ki) is never disclosed nor a fortiori Ki, thus
limiting the risk of spam.
6) Private communications: Our system allows private
communications within users of a group. According to the
group policy, members may learn the inbox key Ki of other
members directly from the member list, or through trusted
external channels like direct communication between people.
A private communication is thus systematically encrypted
using the key Ki, which makes it fundamentally different
from an open communication.
p → dht(h(Ki)) : {{mess.message}K−1p }Ki
In addition, a known mechanism can be used for hiding
the IP address of the sender p to several adversary nodes.
We provide here an example of such mechanism, directly
adapted from Crowds [21]. α and β are random addresses,
messages (2) is sent with probability pf > 1/2 message (3)
is sent otherwise and terminates the protocol.
p → dht(α) : h(Ki).{{mess.message}K−1p }Ki (1)
dht(α) → dht(β) : h(Ki).{{mess.message}K−1p }Ki (2)
dht(α) → h(Ki) : {{mess.message}K−1p }Ki (3)
7) Key renewal: An administrator can decide to renew
keys such as Sw. The reason for a key renewal may be the
banishment of a group member. The administrator sends the
new keys to the inbox of each group member except the
banned member. This is possible because the administrator
knows the list of members and their inboxes Kj . Other more
complex cases have to be considered such as cases where
the administrator cannot directly address the group members
(e.g. members haven’t revealed their Kj). Further work will
investigate the key renewal mechanisms in such cases.
IV. SECURITY AND PRIVACY CONSIDERATIONS
As such the proposed system is a system without au-
thentication. Any user may create its groups and prin-
cipals and associated keys. No central authority and in
particular no public key infrastructure (PKI) is required,
which makes the system scalable. Another advantage is
that anyone can participate by creating it’s principals and
groups. Fundamentally, this is not different from services
such as Wikipedia where anyone may sign in and contribute
without authenticating, or webmail services such as Hotmail
or Yahoo Mail, where anyone can create as many accounts
as he wants without authenticating. The disadvantages of
such systems are that it is possible to squat certain addresses
or to flood the address space. As discussed in Section II
the address space of a DHT is typically 2160. We consider
that an exhaustive flooding of the entire address space of
the system is prohibitive. This cost of flooding may also be
increased using computational puzzles, in a fully distributed
and scalable way [10]. In addition the usage of CGAs and
the address capture mechanism (see Section III-B) reduces
the risk for an adversary to squat a particular address in
the DHT. Finally, distributed systems with no authentication
are subject to Sybil attacks [12] and solutions such Sybil-
Guard [27] deal with this attack. Sybil attacks are out of
scope of the present work.
It is also worth noting that the application plugged on top
of our group management system may implement its own
authentication mechanism, based e.g. on PKIs, mail-address
checking or captchas, thus controlling the users accessing
the underlying system.
A. Security analysis
We first verify the capture and update mechanism. More
precisely we verify that a DY adversary is not able to update
a captured address, unless she captured it herself. Within the
AVISPA framework [1], we provide a formal specification
of the capture mechanism as well as security goal for the
weak authentication of the entity that captures the address3.
The simulation shows that the unpredictability of the
captured addresses is critical. If the DY adversary does not
know a public key prior to the capture of the corresponding
address, no attack is found. Otherwise, for instance if
the adversary knows a key Kl, the attack bellow exists
(messages (1) to (5)). The adversary i turns a predicted
address into an inbox, so that it accepts any further message
without verification:
i → dht(h(Kl)) : mess.message (1)
The group captures (2) and uses (3) (4) the predicted address
without noticing any difference:
g → dht(h(Kl)) : {list.0.{[]}Sl.Kl}K−1
l
(2)
g → dht(h(Kl)) : {list.1.{[p1]}Sl .Kl}K−1
l
(3)
g → dht(h(Kl)) : {list.2.{[p1, p2]}Sl .Kl}K−1
l
(4)
The adversary i(g) pretending to be g replays one former
message that will be accepted without signature and without
increment verification. Here, the effect is the unauthorized
removal of the principal p2 from a group:
i(g) → dht(h(Kl)) : {list.1.{[p1]}Sl .Kl}K−1
l
(5)
We also model the protocol for creating a group, then
creating a principal, and then joining the group (see the
second portion of code in the appendix). We assume a
secure channel between the group creator and the future
administrators. This channel is used for transferring the keys
(K−1l ,Kl), Sk, (K
−1
i ,Ki). The assumption is reasonable
when an administrator is the group creator itself, or when a
secret is shared (which we have modeled in the simulation).
It is also possible that a creator and some administrator
belong to a same private group.
We systematically verified the secrecy of the private keys
and the symmetric keys against two different kinds of DY
adversaries. They both control the messages send over the
network. The first controls all the addresses from the DHT.
The second controls all addresses except those involved in
the management of the group and the principal; note that
this adversary still controls all inbox addresses as well as
addresses of type once.
For private groups, as the group in our toy example
Section II-A, we obtain the secrecy of the group key Kl
against the two types of adversaries. We obtain the secrecy
of the keys of the principal Ki and Kp against the second
type of adversary.
3The AVISPA code is included in appendix.
B. Privacy discussion
We now discuss to which extent our protocol meets the
privacy objectives discussed in Section III-A with an adver-
sary that adheres to the protocol but uses information from
controlled nodes and observed messages to gain additional
information.
Some of the privacy objectives are achieved thanks to
the confidentiality of information. Member anonymity would
be broken if the adversary retrieved the public keys Ki or
Kp from group member lists, walls or inboxes. However,
these structures are encrypted and only accessible to the
group members or group administrators. Thus, a single node
storing a member list, an inbox, a wall or an inbox may
not read these structures. Similarly, the sender anonymity
of a private message would be broken if the adversary
retrieved the public keys Ki or Kp from an inbox. The
sender anonymity is preserved as each inbox private message
is systematically encrypted with the receivers public key.
Member unlinkability also reduces to a confidentiality
property. As a storing node does not know the member list
it is impossible to link its members. Only other members of
the same two groups would be able to link. A determined
enough adversary may try to enroll in many groups until she
links some principals. To protect against the later attack a
user may create different principal for different groups that
he joins. A user may also renounce unlinkability for some
principals that are enrolled in non-critical groups.
Only a very costly attack may break member unlinkability.
The attack supposes that the adversary can observe the entire
address space at a time (which is equivalent to a central
authority). When an administrator just added a joining
principal to the group he updates the list structure and sends
a message helo to the principals inbox. The adversary
may observe these two structures updates occurring at ap-
proximately the same time, and thus infer that the principal
of the inbox just joined the updated group. Repeating this
same attack for a second group would then allow linking
the two members. This attack only reveals the principal’s
inbox address and not its public key. Therefore it does not
break member anonymity nor sender anonymity. In addition
the attack is extremely costly as it requires to continuously
monitor an address space of size 2160. We therefore consider
this attack as unrealistic for our system.
Finally, unlinkability with IP addresses is achieved by
randomly choosing other nodes as proxies as shown in
Section III-C. From an adversary node perspective it is thus
impossible to decide for a given message if the sender’s IP
address is the actual address of the sender.
V. PROTOTYPE
We have implemented a prototype of our protocol as a
proof of concept, with interfacing capabilities with the Vuze
DHT. The goal of this section is to show that (i) our protocol
can be operated on top of a large scale deployed and possibly
Figure 2. Scenario considered in our experiments.
unmodified distributed storage infrastructure, and that (ii)
performances can be acceptable even in an extreme case of
leveraging a DHT implemented for totally other (best effort)
purposes.
A. Settings and challenges
In order to operate a prototype in a real world setting,
we chose to build on Vuze (previously Azureus), a well
known BitTorrent client that includes a DHT (based on
Kademlia) to avoid relying only on centralized trackers
for file distribution. Vuze has been adopted all around
the world, and its DHT is run by around 1.5 millions of
users simultaneously, resulting in various and representative
latencies for a large scale application. It is actually possible
to use this DHT for storing arbitrary data to an also arbitrary
address. The first paper to leverage such an open DHT is
describing the Vanish protocol [16]. Interesting work has
been achieved to parallelize PUT operations on the DHT;
as the code of Vanish experiments is released, we re-use
the Vanish interface to the Vuze DHT. Our prototype uses
the latest release of Vuze (4.7.0.0). Of course, as we do not
control code executed on remote Vuze’s nodes, we can not
impose them to implement the verification we presented in
Section III-B; they only act as simple nodes implementing
a DHT interface.
Prototype is run on a commodity laptop (Intel Core2 Duo
at 2.20GHz, 2.0GiB of memory), and using a basic ADSL
line (down/up: 18000Kbps/1200Kbps). Code is written in
Java and cryptographic operations use the standard Java
Security library.
Using Vuze as a storage back-end for our protocol is
challenging, mostly for two reasons. The first one is that
only 512B of data can be stored by a PUT (< key, value >
insertion). This requires us to fragment the messages and
lists created by our protocol into chunks to store them, and
reversely to re-aggregate those chunks when a GET opera-
tion occurs. The second difficulty is that GET operations are
relatively fast (order of a second), while PUT operations are
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Figure 3. A group member periodically reads and writes the wall, over
a period of 2.5 days. A Poisson process models arrival time of requests,
with an average of one operation every 30 minutes. Operation latencies are
reported in seconds, and c indicates the number of chunks composing the
wall at a given time.
prohibitively long (order of minutes) [16, 15]. Concurrency
is to be kept in mind as some operations need to first get
a state in the DHT and then write a result. We chose to
operate despite those difficulties, in order to provide a best
effort and worst case illustration of our protocol.
B. Scenario: joining a public group
Basic protocol functions, described in Section III-C, have
been implemented; the considered scenario is presented on
Figure 2. It consists in creating a group, and to simulate
arrival of join requests to it (following a Poisson process
with an average arrival every 20 minutes). An administrator
bot frequently retrieves group’s inbox in order to always
positively process those requests (this scenario correspond
to joining a public group). A group member is frequently
retrieving the list of current group members and is also
reading/writing the group’s wall (following another Poisson
process with average 30 minutes). This scenario has been
run continuously during 2.5 days (63 hours precisely).
C. Protocol evaluation
Prior to execute the scenario, we have sequentially created
100 groups from our laptop, right after a cold start of the
Vuze DHT locally. First 3 or 4 creations take a significantly
longer time (2 or 3 time) than the average, measured at 16.1
seconds per group (standard deviation: 6.2s). We re-ran the
same group creation process, this time removing operations
on the DHT to push data to be stored; average time drops
to 0.66s per group. This underlines the fact that network
operations totally dominate local structure manipulations and
basic cryptography.
Figure 3 shows both the time needed by a group member
to retrieves the group’s wall, and the time needed to update
the wall by appending few bytes to it (that could correspond
to adding a tiny URL for instance). As the 512B of allowed
storage per insert are quickly filled by data and integrity
information, our message chunking layer automatically splits
and attributes locations in the DHT for the complete wall to
be stored (first chunk still being at h(Kw), while following
ones are stored at h(Kw.i), with i the ith chunk). Resulting
time to read slightly increases, being related to the time
needed by the slowest chunk holder to answer, and thus
finally allowing wall to be reconstructed. Time needed to
modify the wall is more fluctuating, as contrarily to the
read operation (where a single answer from a chunk replica
node is enough), Vuze waits for replication on the 19 closest
neighbors of the target node to be complete or to time out.
Slow or loaded nodes than slow down the PUT operation.
Please note that we have deliberately chosen to operate in a
worst case setting, as have left the Vuze source code totally
intact, contrarily to paper [16] where some modifications are
made to the Vuze layer itself, making it possible to decrease
storage time from minutes to few seconds.
We now have a look at the time needed by the ad-
ministrator to process each join request arriving in h(Ki),
presented on Figure 4. This constitutes operation of our
protocol under an increasingly unfavorable setting: at the
end of this experiment, 170 joins have been completed, and
the resulting member list is split into 108 chunks (even for
a total weight of only 54KB), as indicated by value c on
the figure. This means that when the storage of structures
defined in Section III-C for join can be achieved in a
single location, we observe latency in the order of a minute.
Contrariwise, the need to split the structures due to storage
constraints (here the member list) makes our protocol rely
on the slowest set of node chosen to store a chunk; we then
reach around 10 minutes at the end of the run in order to
be able to store that list on the 108 hosts and replicas. We
clearly observe the fact that operation time for processing
join is tied to the number of chunks constituting the list:
while time to write on group’s wall (Figure 3) remains
mostly steady, join processing time increases gradually with
the number of chuncks (noted c on figure). A sub-linear
factor increase is nevertheless to be noted, when considering
this number of chunks. Without any dedicated deployment,
simply using Vuze as in, this setting may allow a best effort
and a background group management system to operate,
specially when human interaction is needed to accept or
decline requests.
Directions for dedicated deployment and performance im-
provements are (i) allow a larger storage for < key, value >
than the very restrictive 512B from Vuze; this would confine
performances to the ones on the very left of those two
previous curves. Secondly (ii), DHT operations should be
optimized to return quickly, as proposed in Vanish im-
plementation; this for instance includes a quick PUT of
an operation result on the responsible node in the DHT,
and then to leave consistency on replica nodes occur in
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Figure 4. Time needed by the group administrator to process join requests
(show in minutes). Requests arrive following a Poisson process with on
average one request every 20 minutes, and are fetched by the administrator
as soon as possible.
background.
VI. RELATED WORK
Socially-enhanced applications are currently the main
vectors of the growth of Internet use. If means of handling
social acquaintances are developed on an ad-hoc fashion
by each new application, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no generic group communication and management
system available in a distributed setting. We believe that our
proposal goes in the direction of genericity, reusability and
applicability. We review main applications that take privacy
into account.
Diaspora [13] proposes a completely distributed approach
for Online Social Networks, in reaction to the recent privacy
issues in Facebook. Today the project is still in alpha-phase
and thus only open to a very restricted number of users. We
could not find any scientific publication on the protocols and
security used.
Persona [5] proposes the use of Attribute Based Encryp-
tion [9] to implement fine-grained access policies on shared
content. According to the set of groups a user belongs to
he can decrypt a given content or not. Persona supposes
that all shared content is encrypted. Thus revocation leads
to reencrypting all contents that were accessible by the
concerned group. The system has no specific requirement
on the storage service that hosts the shared data and thus
data may be stored in a distributed manner. Finally, Persona
does not provide any specific privacy properties such as
anonymity or unlinkability. Instead Persona targets the data
confidentiality within a given group.
Backes et al. [3] present a security api/cryptographic
framework for social applications providing access control
on shared content, privacy of social relations, secrecy of
resources, and anonymity of users. Similar to our approach,
users of the system can create as many pseudonyms as they
want and use a different pseudonym for each relation with
the other users of the system. Access control lists are build
upon the created relations. The system uses zero knowledge
protocols to prove the possession of a pseudonym or the
membership of a relation. Proving a relation membership
does not reveal the pseudonym. The system has no specific
requirement on the storage service that hosts the shared data
and thus data may be stored in a distributed manner. The pro-
posed system however relies on a public key infrastructure,
which makes it difficult to scale.
Schiavoi et al. [23] combines gossip-based communi-
cation protocols and onion routing to build a distributed
and private group communication system. Groups consist
in one or several nodes each knowing the public key of the
group. Onion routing is used to achieve sender anonymity,
under the hypothesis that each node published a public key.
Whilst we consider the same threat model regarding privacy
properties, we extend the model to a Dolev-Yao adversary
[14] regarding security properties. In addition, we formally
validate our security objectives against the latter attacker. We
also address a larger set of operations, such as the creation
of a principal and the join mechanism. Moreover we allow
anonymous communication from any member of the group
to any other member of the same the group.
Finally, one may find the concept of group management
related to publish-subscribe mechanisms in distributed sys-
tems [11]. Such systems are typically building multicast
trees among members for message propagation in groups.
They differ in the sense that they are not meant to imple-
ment complex and privacy oriented group management for
interaction with social based applications, but instead focus
on simple on-demand multicast.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown the feasibility of distributing
group management, in the context of a middleware empow-
ering social-based applications. Previous works have only
addressed parts of the distribution process. We saw that
this distribution, as it leverages resources scattered among
many authorities, constrains achievable security objectives.
Yet, this paper shows that reasonable security and privacy
properties can be reached. Our system also removes the
control and lock of a single operator or organization on the
group dynamic, improving state of the art in the direction
of scalable and reusable application.
Future work will focus on the key renewal protocol to
support cases where the group administrator does not know
the group members. Development or adaptation of a load
balancing mechanism for handling popular groups is also
to be achieved. Finally, we envision validating the privacy
properties of our protocol formally using recent extensions
to Scyther [8].
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APPENDIX
HLPSL CODE
We provide here parts of the HLPSL code used for checking security properties. The first portion of code is used for
checking weak authentication of the entity updating a captured node.
% Message types are coded by naturals, 10:root
% 11 is not a real protocol message, it is just here to ease the simulation
role cre (CRE,DHT:agent, Hash:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy)) played_by CRE def=
local State:nat, Kr:public_key
init State:= 0
transition
cr. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|> State’:= 1 /\ Kr’:=new() /\
SND(Hash(Kr’).{10.0.Kr’}_inv(Kr’))
rc. State = 1 /\ RCV(11) =|> State’:= 2
ur. State = 2 =|> State’:= 3 /\ SND(Hash(Kr).{10.1.Kr}_inv(Kr)) /\
witness(DHT,CRE,dht_cre_kr,Kr)
end role
role dht (CRE,DHT:agent, Hash:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy)) played_by DHT def=
local State:nat, Kr:public_key
init State:= 0
transition
cr. State = 0 /\ RCV(Hash(Kr’).{10.0.Kr’}_inv(Kr’)) =|> State’:= 1 /\ SND(11)
ur. State = 1 /\ RCV(Hash(Kr).{10.1.Kr}_inv(Kr)) =|> State’:= 2 /\
wrequest(DHT,CRE,dht_cre_kr,Kr)
end role
role session(CRE,DHT:agent, Hash:hash_func) def=
local SND,RCV:channel(dy)
composition
cre(CRE,DHT,Hash,SND,RCV) /\ dht(CRE,DHT,Hash,SND,RCV)
end role
role environment() def=
const g,d:agent, h:hash_func, dht_cre_kr:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge={g,d,h}
composition
session(g,d,h)
end role
goal weak_authentication_on _cre_kr end goal
environment()
The second portion of code is used for proving secrecy properties, in particular the secrecy of the key Kl for all but the
administrator and the creator. The figure 5 corresponds to a simulation of the second portion of code for creating a group
and a principal and then forging a join request.
% Message types are coded by naturals
% 10:root 20:list 30:once 40:wall 50:join 60:helo 70:mess 80:name (for directory) 90:admin
role cre (CRE,ADM,DHT1,CHT2:agent, Sa:symmetric_key, Hash:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy)) played_by CRE def=
local State,Cr,Cl,Cw:nat, Kr,Ki,Kl,Kw:public_key, Sl,Sw:symmetric_key
init State:= 0
transition
% Capture Root
cr State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|> State’:= 1 /\ Kr’:=new() /\ Ki’:=new() /\
SND(Hash(Kr’).{{10.0.Kr’.Ki’}_inv(Ki’)}_inv(Kr’))
rc. State = 1 /\ RCV(11) =|> State’:= 2
% Capture List
cl. State = 2 =|> State’:=3 /\ Kl’:=new() /\ Sl’:=new() /\
secret(Kl’,secr_kl,{CRE,ADM}) /\
SND(Hash(Kl’).{20.0.{0}_Sl’.Kl’}_inv(Kl’))
lc. State = 3 /\ RCV(21) =|> State’:= 4
% Set Once
so. State = 4 =|> State’:=5 /\ SND({30.{0}_inv(Kl)}_Kl)
os. State = 5 /\ RCV(31) =|> State’:=6
% Securely send Kl Sl Ki to an admin (assuming a dedicated channel Sa)
sa. State = 6 =|> State’:=7 /\ SND({90.Kl.Sl.Ki}_Sa)
as. State = 7 /\ RCV(91) =|> State’:=8
% Publish in Directory
pd. State = 8 =|> State’:=9 /\ SND(80.{Kr}_inv(Kr))
end role
role dir (CRE,DIR,PRI:agent, SND,RCV:channel(dy)) played_by DIR def=
local State:nat, Publish:message
init State:=0
transition
% Recieve and Publish
rp. State = 0 /\ RCV(80.Publish’) =|> State’:=0 /\ SND(81.Publish’)
end role
% this part of the *is* under the control of the adversary
role dht1 (CRE,DHT1,DHT2:agent, Hash:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy)) played_by DHT1 def=
local State,Cr,Cl,Cw:nat, Kr,Ki,Kl,Kw,Kj:public_key, Sl,Sw:symmetric_key, Mi:message
init State:= 0
transition
% Receive Once
cl. State = 0 /\ RCV({30.{0}_inv(Kl)}_Kl) =|> State’:= 0 /\ SND(31)
% Receive any message in inbox
ri. State = 0 /\ RCV(70.Mi’) =|> State’:=0 /\ SND(70.Mi’)
end role
% this part of the dht *is not* under the control of the adversary
role dht2 (CRE,DHT1,DHT2:agent, Hash:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy)) played_by DHT2 def=
local State,Cr,Cl,Cw:nat, Kr,Ki,Kl,Kw,Kj:public_key, Sl,Sw:symmetric_key
init State:= 0
transition
% Capture Root (group)
cr. State = 0 /\ RCV(Hash(Kr’).{{10.0.Kr’.Ki’}_inv(Ki’)}_inv(Kr’)) =|> State’:= 0 /\ SND(11)
pr. State = 0 /\ SND(Hash(Kr).{{10.0.Kr.Ki}_inv(Ki)}_inv(Kr)) =|> State’:= 0 /\ SND(82)
% Capture Root (principal)
cr. State = 0 /\ RCV(Hash(Kr’).{10.0.Kr’}_inv(Kr’)) =|> State’:= 0 /\ SND(11)
% Update Root
ur. State = 0 /\ RCV(Hash(Kr).{{10.1.Kr.Ki}_inv(Ki)}_inv(Kr)) =|> State’:= 1 /\ SND(12)
% Capture List
cl. State = 0 /\ RCV(Hash(Kl’).{20.0.{0}_Sl’.Kl’}_inv(Kl’)) =|> State’:= 0 /\ SND(21)
end role
role adm (CRE,ADM,DHT1,DHT2:agent, Sa:symmetric_key, Hash:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy)) played_by ADM def=
local State,Cr,Cl,Cw:nat, Kr,Ki,Kl,Kw,Kj:public_key, Sl,Sw:symmetric_key
init State:= 0
transition
% Becomming an admin by recieving Kl Sl Ki
cr. State = 0 /\ RCV({90.Kl’.Sl’.Ki’}_Sa) =|> State’:= 1 /\ SND(91)
end role
role pri (PRI,DIR,DHT1,DHT2:agent, Hash:hash_func, SND,RCV:channel(dy)) played_by PRI def=
local State,Cr:nat, Kp,Kj,Kr,Ki:public_key, Sl,Sw:symmetric_key, Mi:message
init State:= 0
transition
% Create Principal
cp. State = 0 /\ RCV(start) =|> State’:=1 /\ Kp’:=new() /\ SND(Hash(Kp’).{10.0.Kp’}_inv(Kp’))
pc. State = 1 /\ RCV(11) =|> State’:=2
% Retrieve group info from the directory
rd. State = 2 /\ RCV(81.{Kr’}_inv(Kr’)) =|> State’:=3
% Retrieve group inbox from the group root
ri. State = 3 /\ RCV(82) =|> RCV({{10.0.Kr’.Ki’}_inv(Ki’)}_inv(Kr’)) /\ State’:=4
% Request Join
%rj. State = 4 /\ Kj’:=new() /\ SND({{{60.Kp.Kj
end role
role session(CRE,ADM,DHT1,DHT2,DIR,PRI:agent, Sa:symmetric_key, Hash:hash_func) def=
local SND,RCV:channel(dy)
composition
cre(CRE,ADM,DHT1,DHT2,Sa,Hash,SND,RCV) /\
adm(CRE,ADM,DHT1,DHT2,Sa,Hash,SND,RCV) /\
dht1(CRE,DHT1,DHT2,Hash,SND,RCV) /\
dht2(CRE,DHT1,DHT2,Hash,SND,RCV) /\
dir(CRE,DIR,PRI,SND,RCV) /\
pri(PRI,DIR,DHT1,DHT2,Hash,SND,RCV)
end role
role environment() def=
const g,a,d1,d2,di,p:agent, sa:symmetric_key, h:hash_func, secr_kl:protocol_id
intruder_knowledge={g,a,d1,d2,di,p,h}
composition
session(g,a,d1,d2,di,p,sa,h)
end role
goal secrecy_of secr_kl end goal
environment()
Figure 5. Simulation of the second portion of code, within the AVISPA + SPAN framework.
